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- March 16, 1987NATIONSpying Between Friends
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- The Pollard verdict causes a wave of unease in Israel
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- No one in Israel was mincing words. Defense Minister Yitzhak
- Rabin called it a "real disaster, a real wound in Israeli-U.S.
- relations." Foreign Minister Shimon Peres admitted that Israel
- had made a "regretful mistake." Declared former Foreign
- Minister Abba Eban: "This is the most difficult moment in the
- history of Israel's international relations, especially because
- the wrongdoing was done here."
-
- The disaster, the wound, the mistake, the wrongdoing turned on
- the case of Jonathan Jay Pollard, 32, an American naval
- intelligence analyst, who was given a sentence of life
- imprisonment last week for spying in Israel's behalf against the
- U.S. Pollard's wife Anne, 26, was condemned to prison for five
- years. In Israel this final denouement of the Pollard affair
- precipitated a painful self- examination of intelligence
- operations as well as worried about the future of the special
- relationship between Israel and the U.S.
-
- The saga of Jonathan Pollard the spy began in the spring of
- 1984, when he first met Colonel Aviam Sella, one of Israel's
- best-known younger military officers, through a mutual
- acquaintance. The Israeli colonel at the time was taking a
- course in computer engineering at New York University. Pollard
- offered to spy for the Israelis and soon began to steal
- documents from the Naval Investigative Service in Suitland, Md.,
- where he worked. On a trip to Paris that fall, he met Yosef
- Yagur, scientific attache at the Israeli consulate in New York
- City, and Rafi Eitan, the former deputy head of Mossad, the
- Israeli intelligence agency. Eitan was running the small,
- little-known intelligence unit to which Pollard was passing
- information. Month after month, Pollard delivered highly
- classified documents to the apartment of Irit Erb, a secretary
- at the Israeli embassy in Washington, where the material was
- photocopied.
-
- In November 1985, co-workers finally noted that Pollard was
- taking classified papers home with him and informed the FBI.
- During the ensuing interrogation, Pollard phoned his wife and
- alerted her to what was happening by using the code word
- "cactus." Anne Henderson- Pollard then warned the Israelis of
- the impending danger and tried unsuccessfully to dispose of a
- suitcase full of classified documents. A few days later the
- Pollards drove to the Israel-embassy compound, where they
- apparently hoped to gain refuge and perhaps political asylum.
- But the Israelis, realizing the Pollards were being followed by
- the FBI, turned them away, and the pair were soon arrested.
- Sella, Yagur and Erb quietly slipped out of the country.
-
- In a world in which spying between friendly nations is not
- uncommon, what was unusual about the Pollard case? For one
- thing, the sheer volume of the intelligence material Pollard
- stole and turned over to Israel. According tot he Government,
- if all these documents were stacked in one place, the resulting
- mountain of papers would be 6 ft. wide, 6 ft. deep and 10 ft.
- high. Furthermore, the material stolen covered a wide range of
- highly sensitive subjects, from nuclear facilities in Iraq and
- Pakistan to Soviet surface-to-air-missile capabilities to the
- antiaircraft defense around the Palestine Liberation
- Organization headquarters in Tunis. Israel later staged an air
- attack on the P.L.O. buildings, killing at least 60 Tunisians
- and Palestinians. Declared Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger:
- "It is difficult for me to conceive of a greater harm to
- national security than that caused by the defendant in view of
- the breadth, the critical importance of the U.S. and the high
- sensitivity of the information he sold to Israel."
-
- Throughout the case, Pollard's attorneys attempted to portray
- their client as an idealistic Zionist whose actions were based
- on his concern for Israel's security and survival. The
- prosecution, however, pointed out that Pollard had received some
- $50,000 for his espionage and, had he remained in the service
- of the Israelis for an additional nine years, would have wound
- up with at least $500,000.
-
- The defense also based its case on the contention that spying
- for Israel, a close U.S. ally, was fundamentally different from
- spying for, say, the Soviet Union and that nobody could prove
- Pollard's actions had actually harmed his country. The
- prosecution took a dim view of that argument. Explains John
- Martin, the Justice Department's chief of internal security:
- "God forbid that the day should come when we would have the
- burden of showing that not only did a spy give up information
- on nuclear weapons but that those weapons were used under
- hostile conditions."
-
- Outside the courtroom, Pollard and his wife were making
- statements that were as legally compromising as anything in
- their testimony. In a letter published in the Jerusalem Post,
- Pollard wrote of his "absolute obligation" to spy for Israel and
- alluded to circumstances in which a person might be forced to
- use "situational ethics" as a guide to his conduct. His wife,
- interviewed on CBS's 60 Minutes, spoke of the responsibility of
- American Jews to aid Israel. Said she: "I feel my husband and
- i did what we were expected to do, what our moral obligation was
- as Jews [and] as human beings, and I have no regrets about
- that."
-
- In an unusually emotional courtroom finale, the Pollards
- pleaded desperately for clemency. But despite the fact that
- Pollard entered a guilty plea last summer and since then had
- been cooperating to some degree with the Government in fingering
- the Israel officials with whom he had worked, U.S. District
- Court Judge Aubrey Robinson Jr. concluded that Pollard's crime
- merited the harshest punishment the court could impose.
-
- When the case first broke in late 1985, the U.S. was not yet
- aware of the seriousness of the espionage, and accepted Israeli
- promises of assistance in settling the affair. The Justice
- Department wanted to proceed with the trial of Pollard and the
- indictment of his Israeli contact, but the State Department
- argued that American relations with Israel should receive
- primary consideration. Secretary of State George Shultz spoke
- of Israeli "cooperation" on the case, and State Department Legal
- Adviser Abraham Sofaer headed a delegation that was sent to
- Israel to collect the documents Pollard had stolen. According
- to court records, Sofaer returned with a mere 163 documents out
- of the thousands that had been taken.
-
- Gradually the Administration's anger increased as it realized
- the gravity of the security breach and the difficulty of
- ascertaining exactly what had happened. Moreover, though
- Jerusalem still insisted that Pollard had been part of a "rogue"
- spy team, Washington began to suspect that those who had worked
- with him were actually being rewarded. Eitan, who had headed
- the Pollard operation, was appointed board chairman of Israel
- Chemicals, a large government-owned company. Two weeks ago
- Colonel Sella was named commander of one of Israel's most
- important air bases, Tel Nof.
-
- After learning of Sella's promotion, the Administration canceled
- a joint American-Israeli air-force training course and put Tel
- Nof off limits to U.S. officers and other officials. In
- addition, the Administration threatened to suspend its policy
- of military cooperation with the Israeli air force unless
- Sella's appointment was rescinded. Last week a federal grand
- jury in Washington issued an indictment against Sella.
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- Israel's Foreign Minister Peres is undoubtedly right in his
- judgment that the "body of relations" between the U.S. and
- Israel is strong and can withstand the shock of the Pollard
- affair. But the case raises troubling questions about the
- proprieties of espionage between allies. Says the Justice
- Department's Martin: "Even as friendly as you are, there are
- times when national interests are different. It is up to
- policymakers to decide who gets what. We can't have individuals
- secretly providing information to any friend or foe."
-
- --By William E. Smith. Reported by Ron Ben-Yishai/Jerusalem
- and Anne Constable/Washington
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